fix: seven quick-win bug fixes across engine, server, TUI, CLI
1. Alertless monitors no longer spam error logs — triggerAlert returns early when alertID <= 0. 2. HTTP response body drained before close — enables connection reuse via keep-alive instead of fresh TCP+TLS per check. 3. /api/backup/export enforces GET — was the only endpoint accepting any HTTP method. 4. limitStr guards against max < 3 — prevents negative slice index panic on very narrow terminals. 5. Filter input accepts multibyte characters — len(msg.Runes) instead of len(msg.String()) for proper Unicode support. 6. Startup warning corrected — with no UPTOP_CLUSTER_SECRET, endpoints reject (401), not accept. Warning now says so. 7. UPTOP_KEYS file open failure logged — was silently swallowed, leaving operators with no admin seeded and no message.
This commit was merged in pull request #111.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package monitor
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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@@ -103,7 +104,10 @@ func runHTTPCheck(ctx context.Context, site models.SiteConfig, strict, insecure
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result.ErrorReason = truncateError(err.Error(), maxErrorLength)
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return result
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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defer func() {
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_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
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_ = resp.Body.Close()
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}()
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result.StatusCode = resp.StatusCode
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if !isCodeAccepted(resp.StatusCode, site.AcceptedCodes) {
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@@ -864,6 +864,9 @@ func (e *Engine) handleStatusChange(snap models.Site, rawStatus string, code int
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}
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func (e *Engine) triggerAlert(alertID int, title, message string) {
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if alertID <= 0 {
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return
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}
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cfg, err := e.db.GetAlert(context.Background(), alertID)
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if err != nil {
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e.AddLog(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to load alert config %d: %v", alertID, err))
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@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func Start(cfg ServerConfig, s store.Store, eng *monitor.Engine) *http.Server {
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func (s *Server) Start() *http.Server {
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if s.cfg.ClusterKey == "" {
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slog.Warn("no UPTOP_CLUSTER_SECRET set, cluster API endpoints are unauthenticated")
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slog.Warn("no UPTOP_CLUSTER_SECRET set, cluster API endpoints will reject all requests")
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}
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if s.cfg.ClusterMode != "" && s.cfg.ClusterMode != "leader" && s.cfg.TLSCert == "" {
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@@ -168,6 +168,10 @@ func (s *Server) handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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}
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func (s *Server) handleExport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
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http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
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return
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}
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if !s.requireAuth(r) {
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http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: UPTOP_CLUSTER_SECRET required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ func (m Model) emptyState(message, hint string) string {
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}
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func limitStr(text string, max int) string {
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if max < 3 {
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return text
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}
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runes := []rune(text)
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if len(runes) > max {
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return string(runes[:max-3]) + "..."
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@@ -336,8 +336,8 @@ func (m *Model) handleFilterKey(msg tea.KeyMsg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
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case "ctrl+c":
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return m, tea.Quit
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default:
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if len(msg.String()) == 1 {
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m.filterText += msg.String()
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if len(msg.Runes) == 1 {
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m.filterText += string(msg.Runes)
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m.cursor = 0
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m.tableOffset = 0
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m.refreshLive()
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