fix(security): close XFF bypass and three secret-leak paths

Four fixes hardening the secrets and rate-limit posture a prior audit
left or that regressed:

X-Forwarded-For rate-limit bypass + memory DoS (ratelimit.go): clientIP
returned the raw XFF header, so an attacker rotating it minted unlimited
distinct limiter keys — never tripping the limit and growing the visitors
map without bound. XFF is now honored only when the immediate peer is a
configured trusted proxy (UPTOP_TRUSTED_PROXIES, CIDRs or bare IPs), using
the right-most non-trusted hop; otherwise the key is the real RemoteAddr.
The visitors map is bounded with LRU eviction as defense in depth.

Export redaction denylist -> per-provider allowlist (server.go): the old
six-key denylist missed the actual credentials — the webhook URL for
discord/slack/webhook/ntfy/gotify and api_key for opsgenie — exporting
them in the clear. redactByProvider keeps only known-safe keys per
provider type and redacts everything else, so unknown/new keys fail safe.

ImportData plaintext secrets (sqlstore.go): import inserted raw
json.Marshal(settings), bypassing the encryption AddAlert/UpdateAlert
use. It now routes through marshalSettings, so a restore with
UPTOP_ENCRYPTION_KEY set stores enc:-prefixed ciphertext, not plaintext.

Alert error credential leak (alert.go): provider Send returned the raw
*url.Error, whose URL carries the secret (Telegram bot token in the path,
webhook secrets in the URL); it was persisted to AlertHealth.LastError
and shown in the TUI. sanitizeError strips the URL, keeping the operation
and underlying cause.

Tests cover trusted/untrusted XFF + spoofed-bypass + map bound, the
allowlist per provider, encrypted-on-import round-trip, and URL-stripped
errors. README documents UPTOP_TRUSTED_PROXIES. Full suite green under
-race; golangci-lint clean.

README.md

@@ -138,9 +138,22 @@ Full reference in [docs/config-as-code.md](docs/config-as-code.md).
 | `UPTOP_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY` | `false` | Skip TLS verification for checks |
 | `UPTOP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_TARGETS` | `false` | Allow monitoring RFC1918/loopback addresses |
 | `UPTOP_ADMIN_KEY` | | SSH public key seeded as first admin on startup |
+| `UPTOP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | | Comma-separated CIDRs/IPs whose `X-Forwarded-For` is trusted ([details](#running-behind-a-reverse-proxy)) |
 
 See [`.env.example`](.env.example) for all options including TLS, probes, and advanced settings.
 
+### Running behind a reverse proxy
+
+By default uptop ignores the `X-Forwarded-For` header and rate-limits by the direct connection address — so a client can't spoof the header to bypass limits. If uptop sits behind a reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy, Cloudflare, an ALB), set `UPTOP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the proxy's address(es) so the real client IP is used instead:
+
+    # single nginx/Caddy on the same host
+    UPTOP_TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1
+
+    # a proxy subnet, or Cloudflare ranges
+    UPTOP_TRUSTED_PROXIES=10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12
+
+Only requests whose immediate peer is in this list have their `X-Forwarded-For` honored (right-most non-trusted hop wins). Bare IPs are treated as single hosts; invalid entries are warned about and skipped. Leave it unset if uptop is exposed directly.
+
 ### Encryption
 
 Set `UPTOP_ENCRYPTION_KEY` to encrypt alert credentials (SMTP passwords, webhook URLs, API tokens) at rest with AES-256-GCM. Generate a key:

cmd/uptop/main.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"flag"
 	"fmt"
 	"log"
+	"net"
 	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
@@ -85,6 +86,39 @@ func redactDSN(dsn string) string {
 	return u.String()
 }
 
+// parseTrustedProxies turns UPTOP_TRUSTED_PROXIES (comma-separated CIDRs or
+// bare IPs) into networks the rate limiter trusts to set X-Forwarded-For. Bare
+// IPs are treated as single-host ranges. Invalid entries are warned about and
+// skipped, so a typo degrades to "ignore XFF" (safe) rather than aborting boot.
+func parseTrustedProxies(raw string) []*net.IPNet {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(raw) == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var cidrs []*net.IPNet
+	for _, part := range strings.Split(raw, ",") {
+		part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
+		if part == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(part, "/") {
+			if ip := net.ParseIP(part); ip != nil {
+				bits := 32
+				if ip.To4() == nil {
+					bits = 128
+				}
+				part = fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d", part, bits)
+			}
+		}
+		_, ipnet, err := net.ParseCIDR(part)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "WARNING: ignoring invalid UPTOP_TRUSTED_PROXIES entry %q: %v\n", part, err)
+			continue
+		}
+		cidrs = append(cidrs, ipnet)
+	}
+	return cidrs
+}
+
 func openStore(dbType, dsn string) store.Store {
 	var ss *store.SQLStore
 	var err error
@@ -406,6 +440,7 @@ func runServe(args []string) {
 		ClusterMode:    clusterMode,
 		MetricsPublic:  os.Getenv("UPTOP_METRICS_PUBLIC") == "true",
 		CORSOrigin:     os.Getenv("UPTOP_CORS_ORIGIN"),
+		TrustedProxies: parseTrustedProxies(os.Getenv("UPTOP_TRUSTED_PROXIES")),
 	}, s, eng)
 
 	cluster.Start(ctx, cluster.Config{

internal/alert/alert.go

@@ -4,9 +4,11 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/smtp"
+	"net/url"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
@@ -16,6 +18,22 @@ import (
 
 var alertClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
 
+// sanitizeError strips the request URL from transport errors before they are
+// stored or displayed. *url.Error embeds the full URL, which for several
+// providers carries the credential itself (Telegram bot token in the path,
+// webhook secrets in the URL). The operation and underlying cause — the useful
+// diagnostic — are preserved.
+func sanitizeError(err error) error {
+	if err == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var urlErr *url.Error
+	if errors.As(err, &urlErr) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s request failed: %w", urlErr.Op, urlErr.Err)
+	}
+	return err
+}
+
 type Provider interface {
 	Send(ctx context.Context, title, message string) error
 }
@@ -43,7 +61,7 @@ func (h *HTTPProvider) Send(ctx context.Context, title, message string) error {
 	}
 	resp, err := alertClient.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		return sanitizeError(err)
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
 	if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
@@ -262,7 +280,7 @@ func (n *NtfyProvider) Send(ctx context.Context, title, message string) error {
 	}
 	resp, err := alertClient.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		return sanitizeError(err)
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
 	if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {

internal/alert/alert_test.go

@@ -3,8 +3,11 @@ package alert
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"gitea.lerkolabs.com/lerkolabs/uptop/internal/models"
@@ -298,3 +301,32 @@ func TestSanitizeHeader(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// sanitizeError must strip the credential-bearing URL from a *url.Error while
+// keeping the operation and underlying cause.
+func TestSanitizeError(t *testing.T) {
+	urlErr := &url.Error{
+		Op:  "Post",
+		URL: "https://api.telegram.org/bot123456:SECRET_TOKEN/sendMessage",
+		Err: errors.New("dial tcp: connection refused"),
+	}
+	got := sanitizeError(urlErr).Error()
+
+	for _, leak := range []string{"SECRET_TOKEN", "api.telegram.org", "sendMessage", "bot123456"} {
+		if strings.Contains(got, leak) {
+			t.Errorf("sanitized error leaked %q: %s", leak, got)
+		}
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(got, "connection refused") {
+		t.Errorf("expected underlying cause preserved, got: %s", got)
+	}
+
+	// Non-url errors pass through unchanged.
+	plain := errors.New("plain failure")
+	if sanitizeError(plain).Error() != "plain failure" {
+		t.Errorf("non-url error altered: %s", sanitizeError(plain))
+	}
+	if sanitizeError(nil) != nil {
+		t.Error("nil should stay nil")
+	}
+}

internal/server/ratelimit.go

@@ -3,10 +3,17 @@ package server
 import (
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 )
 
+// maxVisitors caps the rate-limiter map so a flood of distinct keys can't grow
+// it without bound. With the trusted-proxy gate below, keys come from real peer
+// addresses, so this is a defense-in-depth ceiling rather than the primary
+// guard.
+const maxVisitors = 10000
+
 type visitor struct {
 	tokens   float64
 	lastSeen time.Time
@@ -17,13 +24,15 @@ type RateLimiter struct {
 	visitors map[string]*visitor
 	rate     float64
 	burst    float64
+	trusted  []*net.IPNet
 }
 
-func NewRateLimiter(requestsPerMinute int) *RateLimiter {
+func NewRateLimiter(requestsPerMinute int, trusted []*net.IPNet) *RateLimiter {
 	rl := &RateLimiter{
 		visitors: make(map[string]*visitor),
 		rate:     float64(requestsPerMinute) / 60.0,
 		burst:    float64(requestsPerMinute),
+		trusted:  trusted,
 	}
 	go rl.cleanup()
 	return rl
@@ -37,6 +46,9 @@ func (rl *RateLimiter) Allow(ip string) bool {
 	now := time.Now()
 
 	if !exists {
+		if len(rl.visitors) >= maxVisitors {
+			rl.evictOldest()
+		}
 		rl.visitors[ip] = &visitor{tokens: rl.burst - 1, lastSeen: now}
 		return true
 	}
@@ -55,6 +67,22 @@ func (rl *RateLimiter) Allow(ip string) bool {
 	return true
 }
 
+// evictOldest removes the least-recently-seen visitor. Called only when the map
+// is at capacity, so the O(n) scan is rare. Caller holds rl.mu.
+func (rl *RateLimiter) evictOldest() {
+	var oldestKey string
+	var oldest time.Time
+	for k, v := range rl.visitors {
+		if oldestKey == "" || v.lastSeen.Before(oldest) {
+			oldestKey = k
+			oldest = v.lastSeen
+		}
+	}
+	if oldestKey != "" {
+		delete(rl.visitors, oldestKey)
+	}
+}
+
 func (rl *RateLimiter) cleanup() {
 	for {
 		time.Sleep(5 * time.Minute)
@@ -69,20 +97,54 @@ func (rl *RateLimiter) cleanup() {
 	}
 }
 
-func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
-	if fwd := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); fwd != "" {
-		return fwd
-	}
+// clientIP determines the rate-limit key for a request. X-Forwarded-For is only
+// honored when the immediate peer (RemoteAddr) is a configured trusted proxy;
+// otherwise the header is attacker-controlled and ignored, so a spoofed XFF
+// can't mint unlimited distinct keys (rate-limit bypass + memory DoS). When the
+// peer is trusted, the right-most address that is not itself a trusted proxy is
+// the real client (RFC 7239 right-most-untrusted-hop).
+func clientIP(r *http.Request, trusted []*net.IPNet) string {
 	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
 	if err != nil {
-		return r.RemoteAddr
+		host = r.RemoteAddr
+	}
+
+	if len(trusted) == 0 || !ipInCIDRs(net.ParseIP(host), trusted) {
+		return host
+	}
+
+	xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
+	if xff == "" {
+		return host
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(xff, ",")
+	for i := len(parts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+		ip := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(parts[i]))
+		if ip == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if !ipInCIDRs(ip, trusted) {
+			return ip.String()
+		}
 	}
 	return host
 }
 
+func ipInCIDRs(ip net.IP, cidrs []*net.IPNet) bool {
+	if ip == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, c := range cidrs {
+		if c.Contains(ip) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 func RateLimit(limiter *RateLimiter, next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		if !limiter.Allow(clientIP(r)) {
+		if !limiter.Allow(clientIP(r, limiter.trusted)) {
 			http.Error(w, "Rate limit exceeded", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
 			return
 		}

internal/server/server.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"html/template"
 	"log"
+	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"sort"
 	"strings"
@@ -32,18 +33,36 @@ func extractBearerToken(r *http.Request) string {
 	return ""
 }
 
-var sensitiveKeys = map[string]bool{
-	"pass": true, "password": true, "token": true,
-	"routing_key": true, "user": true, "username": true,
+// safeSettingKeys lists, per provider type, the settings that are NOT secret
+// and may be exported in the clear. Everything else is redacted. Providers
+// absent from this map (discord, slack, webhook, pushover) carry their secret
+// in a field a denylist would miss — the webhook URL, the pushover token/user —
+// so all of their settings are redacted.
+var safeSettingKeys = map[string]map[string]bool{
+	"email":     {"host": true, "port": true, "to": true, "from": true},
+	"ntfy":      {"topic": true, "priority": true},
+	"telegram":  {"chat_id": true},
+	"pagerduty": {"severity": true},
+	"gotify":    {"priority": true},
+	"opsgenie":  {"priority": true, "eu": true},
 }
 
-func redactSettings(settings map[string]string) map[string]string {
+// redactByProvider keeps only the known-safe keys for the alert type and
+// redacts everything else. An allowlist fails safe: an unknown or newly added
+// setting is redacted by default instead of leaking. This closes the denylist
+// gap where url (discord/slack/webhook/ntfy/gotify) and api_key (opsgenie) —
+// the actual credentials — were exported in the clear.
+func redactByProvider(alertType string, settings map[string]string) map[string]string {
+	safe := safeSettingKeys[alertType]
 	redacted := make(map[string]string, len(settings))
 	for k, v := range settings {
-		if sensitiveKeys[k] && v != "" {
-			redacted[k] = "***REDACTED***"
-		} else {
+		switch {
+		case v == "":
+			redacted[k] = ""
+		case safe[k]:
 			redacted[k] = v
+		default:
+			redacted[k] = "***REDACTED***"
 		}
 	}
 	return redacted
@@ -191,6 +210,7 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
 	ClusterMode    string
 	MetricsPublic  bool
 	CORSOrigin     string
+	TrustedProxies []*net.IPNet
 }
 
 func Start(cfg ServerConfig, s store.Store, eng *monitor.Engine) *http.Server {
@@ -198,10 +218,10 @@ func Start(cfg ServerConfig, s store.Store, eng *monitor.Engine) *http.Server {
 		fmt.Println("WARNING: No UPTOP_CLUSTER_SECRET set. Cluster API endpoints are unauthenticated.")
 	}
 
-	pushRL := NewRateLimiter(60)
-	probeRL := NewRateLimiter(30)
-	backupRL := NewRateLimiter(10)
-	statusRL := NewRateLimiter(120)
+	pushRL := NewRateLimiter(60, cfg.TrustedProxies)
+	probeRL := NewRateLimiter(30, cfg.TrustedProxies)
+	backupRL := NewRateLimiter(10, cfg.TrustedProxies)
+	statusRL := NewRateLimiter(120, cfg.TrustedProxies)
 
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 
@@ -258,7 +278,7 @@ func Start(cfg ServerConfig, s store.Store, eng *monitor.Engine) *http.Server {
 		}
 		if r.URL.Query().Get("redact_secrets") != "false" {
 			for i := range data.Alerts {
-				data.Alerts[i].Settings = redactSettings(data.Alerts[i].Settings)
+				data.Alerts[i].Settings = redactByProvider(data.Alerts[i].Type, data.Alerts[i].Settings)
 			}
 		}
 		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data) //nolint:errcheck
@@ -482,7 +502,7 @@ func Start(cfg ServerConfig, s store.Store, eng *monitor.Engine) *http.Server {
 		fmt.Println("WARNING: Cluster mode active without TLS. Secrets transmitted in cleartext.")
 	}
 
-	handler := loggingMiddleware(securityHeadersMiddleware(mux))
+	handler := loggingMiddleware(cfg.TrustedProxies, securityHeadersMiddleware(mux))
 	if cfg.TLSCert != "" {
 		handler = hstsMiddleware(handler)
 	}
@@ -522,13 +542,13 @@ func (w *statusWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
 	w.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
 }
 
-func loggingMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+func loggingMiddleware(trusted []*net.IPNet, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		start := time.Now()
 		sw := &statusWriter{ResponseWriter: w, code: 200}
 		next.ServeHTTP(sw, r)
 		path := strings.ReplaceAll(strings.ReplaceAll(r.URL.Path, "\n", ""), "\r", "")
-		log.Printf("%s %s %d %s %s", r.Method, path, sw.code, time.Since(start).Round(time.Millisecond), clientIP(r)) //nolint:gosec // path sanitized above
+		log.Printf("%s %s %d %s %s", r.Method, path, sw.code, time.Since(start).Round(time.Millisecond), clientIP(r, trusted)) //nolint:gosec // path sanitized above
 	})
 }
 

internal/server/server_test.go

@@ -565,3 +565,108 @@ func TestProbeAssignments_Unauthorized(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("expected 401, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
 	}
 }
+
+// --- Security: X-Forwarded-For trusted-proxy handling ---
+
+func mustCIDR(t *testing.T, s string) *net.IPNet {
+	t.Helper()
+	_, n, err := net.ParseCIDR(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ParseCIDR(%q): %v", s, err)
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+func TestClientIP_TrustedProxyHandling(t *testing.T) {
+	trusted := []*net.IPNet{mustCIDR(t, "10.0.0.0/8")}
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		remoteAddr string
+		xff        string
+		trusted    []*net.IPNet
+		want       string
+	}{
+		{"no trusted proxies ignores XFF", "203.0.113.9:5000", "1.2.3.4", nil, "203.0.113.9"},
+		{"untrusted peer ignores XFF", "203.0.113.9:5000", "1.2.3.4", trusted, "203.0.113.9"},
+		{"trusted peer honors XFF", "10.0.0.5:5000", "1.2.3.4", trusted, "1.2.3.4"},
+		{"trusted peer, rightmost-untrusted hop", "10.0.0.5:5000", "1.2.3.4, 10.0.0.9", trusted, "1.2.3.4"},
+		{"trusted peer, no XFF falls back to peer", "10.0.0.5:5000", "", trusted, "10.0.0.5"},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			r, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+			r.RemoteAddr = tt.remoteAddr
+			if tt.xff != "" {
+				r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", tt.xff)
+			}
+			if got := clientIP(r, tt.trusted); got != tt.want {
+				t.Errorf("clientIP = %q, want %q", got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// A spoofed, rotating X-Forwarded-For from an untrusted peer must NOT bypass
+// the limiter: all requests key on the real RemoteAddr, so the bucket trips.
+func TestRateLimit_SpoofedXFFCannotBypass(t *testing.T) {
+	rl := NewRateLimiter(60, nil) // no trusted proxies
+	allowed := 0
+	for i := 0; i < 200; i++ {
+		r, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+		r.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.9:5000"
+		r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", fmt.Sprintf("9.9.9.%d", i%256))
+		if rl.Allow(clientIP(r, rl.trusted)) {
+			allowed++
+		}
+	}
+	if allowed > 60 {
+		t.Errorf("spoofed XFF bypassed limiter: %d/200 allowed (burst is 60)", allowed)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRateLimit_VisitorMapBounded(t *testing.T) {
+	rl := NewRateLimiter(60, nil)
+	for i := 0; i < maxVisitors+500; i++ {
+		rl.Allow(fmt.Sprintf("10.1.%d.%d", i/256, i%256))
+	}
+	rl.mu.Lock()
+	n := len(rl.visitors)
+	rl.mu.Unlock()
+	if n > maxVisitors {
+		t.Errorf("visitor map exceeded cap: %d > %d", n, maxVisitors)
+	}
+}
+
+// --- Security: export redaction allowlist ---
+
+func TestRedactByProvider(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		typ      string
+		in       map[string]string
+		redacted []string // keys expected to be ***REDACTED***
+		kept     []string // keys expected to survive verbatim
+	}{
+		{"discord url is secret", "discord", map[string]string{"url": "https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1/abc"}, []string{"url"}, nil},
+		{"opsgenie api_key redacted, priority kept", "opsgenie", map[string]string{"api_key": "k", "priority": "P1", "eu": "true"}, []string{"api_key"}, []string{"priority", "eu"}},
+		{"email creds redacted, routing kept", "email", map[string]string{"host": "smtp.x.com", "port": "587", "to": "a@x.com", "from": "b@x.com", "user": "u", "pass": "p"}, []string{"user", "pass"}, []string{"host", "port", "to", "from"}},
+		{"telegram token redacted, chat_id kept", "telegram", map[string]string{"token": "123:ABC", "chat_id": "42"}, []string{"token"}, []string{"chat_id"}},
+		{"unknown provider redacts everything", "mystery", map[string]string{"anything": "x"}, []string{"anything"}, nil},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			out := redactByProvider(tt.typ, tt.in)
+			for _, k := range tt.redacted {
+				if out[k] != "***REDACTED***" {
+					t.Errorf("key %q: expected redacted, got %q", k, out[k])
+				}
+			}
+			for _, k := range tt.kept {
+				if out[k] != tt.in[k] {
+					t.Errorf("key %q: expected kept %q, got %q", k, tt.in[k], out[k])
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/store/sqlstore.go

@@ -724,11 +724,13 @@ func (s *SQLStore) ImportData(data models.Backup) error {
 		}
 	}
 	for _, a := range data.Alerts {
-		jsonBytes, err := json.Marshal(a.Settings)
+		// Encrypt on import exactly as AddAlert/UpdateAlert do, so a restore
+		// honors UPTOP_ENCRYPTION_KEY instead of writing secrets in plaintext.
+		settingsStr, err := s.marshalSettings(a.Settings)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-		if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q("INSERT INTO alerts (id, name, type, settings) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)"), a.ID, a.Name, a.Type, string(jsonBytes)); err != nil {
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(s.q("INSERT INTO alerts (id, name, type, settings) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)"), a.ID, a.Name, a.Type, settingsStr); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 	}

internal/store/sqlstore_test.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package store
 
 import (
 	"fmt"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
@@ -441,3 +442,42 @@ func TestPruneExpiredMaintenanceWindows(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// ImportData must encrypt alert settings (like AddAlert/UpdateAlert) so a
+// restore with UPTOP_ENCRYPTION_KEY set never lands secrets in plaintext.
+func TestImportData_EncryptsAlertSettings(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTestStore(t)
+	enc, err := NewEncryptor(strings.Repeat("ab", 32)) // 64 hex chars = 32 bytes
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewEncryptor: %v", err)
+	}
+	s.SetEncryptor(enc)
+
+	backup := models.Backup{
+		Alerts: []models.AlertConfig{
+			{ID: 1, Name: "tg", Type: "telegram", Settings: map[string]string{"token": "123:SECRET", "chat_id": "42"}},
+		},
+	}
+	if err := s.ImportData(backup); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ImportData: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	var raw string
+	if err := s.db.QueryRow("SELECT settings FROM alerts WHERE id = 1").Scan(&raw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("query settings: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(raw, encryptedPrefix) {
+		t.Errorf("imported settings not encrypted: %q", raw)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(raw, "SECRET") {
+		t.Errorf("plaintext secret found in stored column: %q", raw)
+	}
+
+	alerts, err := s.GetAllAlerts()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetAllAlerts: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(alerts) != 1 || alerts[0].Settings["token"] != "123:SECRET" {
+		t.Errorf("decrypt round-trip failed: %+v", alerts)
+	}
+}